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REASSESSING THE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
OF CARE FOR MINORS
CAROLINE FORELL*

Most American jurisdictions have two different standards of care, the
adult "reasonable person under the circumstances" standard and the more
individualized child standard of care for situations where the negligence
of a minor causes injuries.' Courts and commentators claim that the adult
standard is used when a minor was engaged in an adult activity.2 An
analysis of the cases involving the use of firearms and motor vehicles by
minors demonstrates that the use of different standards of care for minors
is not based upon whether the activity is engaged in mostly by adults.
In reality, courts apply the adult standard only if a minor was operating
a motor vehicle.' Furthermore, increating a two-tiered system of assessing
the negligence of minors, the courts have made unjustified distinctions.
The courts' misapplication of the negligence standards for minors is the
result of their reliance upon inappropriate protective notions about certain
dangerous activities, such as hunting, in deciding which standard of care
to use.
This Article will examine and critique this two-tiered system. First,
the Article will describe the two standards of care. Then, it will focus
upon courts' application of the child standard of care to minors' use of
firearms and their application of the adult standard of care to minors' use
of motor vehicles. The final part of this Article will examine the rationales
underlying the child standard of care. It will show that a two-standard
system should be retained. It will also show, however, that the child
standard of care is only appropriate for a limited group of activities:
carefree activities where, even if the minor uses poor judgment, harm to
others is very unlikely. The remaining activities are those which are likely
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; J.D., University of Iowa,
1978.
I. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts 179-81 (5th ed. 1984); Gray, The Standard
of Carefor Children Revisited, 45 Mo. L. Rev. 597, 604-20 (1980). The majority of states do not
apply negligence principles to children three years old and under. Gray, supra, at 598. Most states
do apply negligence principles to children seven years or older. Id. at 598-99. Jurisdictions vary
greatly in their treatment of children between the ages of three and seven charged with negligence.
Id. The scope of this Article is limited to a discussion of the standard of care to be applied to minors
found by courts to be old enough to be capable of negligent conduct.
2. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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to cause serious harm to others unless the child uses mature judgment.
The adult standard of care should apply to these dangerous activities.
I. DEFINING THE STANDARDS OF CARE
The Restatement (Second) of Torts' definitions for the two standards
of care are representative of those most courts use. 4 A child must use the
same degree of care as a reasonable child "of like age, intelligence, and
experience under like circumstances." 5 An adult must act like a "reasonable person under like circumstances. 6 Accordingly, it is easier to
conform to the child's standard of care than to the adult's standard. 7
Comment c to Restatement (Second) of Torts section 283A states that
the exception to the child standard of care "arise[s] where a child [is]
engage[d] in an activity which is normally undertaken only by adults,
and for which adult qualifications are required. - 8 Courts hold a minor
engaged in this kind of activity to the adult standard of care. 9 This is
most commonly described as the adult activity exception. " It is of modem
origin, having been widely recognized by courts in the 1960s and 1970s. "
4. See, e.g., Uddo v. Parker, 31 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748 (Ct. App. 1963); Dellwo v. Pearson, 107
N.W.2d 859, 863 (Minn. 1961); Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 633-34 (1968); Thomas
v. Inman, 282 Or. 279, 285-86, 578 P.2d 399, 403 (1978); Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392,
393-94 (Wash. 1979).
5. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A (1965).
6. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1965).
In defining "child," the Restatement negatively implies that an adult is a person of such mature
years as to be capable of exercising the judgment, intelligence, knowledge, experience, and prudence
demanded by the standard of the reasonable person. Id. at § 283A comment a.
Many commentators and courts, howeler, have defined adult more arbitrarily as any person over
the legal age of majority, typically 18. See, e.g., Goss v. Allen, 360 A.2d 388, 391 (N.J. 1976).
7. Commentators have described and defended the child standard as having both subjective and
objective facets. They note that, although the standard considers the particular child's "age, intelligence and experience," the standard remains objective by applying a "reasonable person with these
particular attributes under the circumstances" test. See Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of
Children, 37 Yale L.J. 618, 622-23 (1928); Note, A Proposalfor a Modified Standard of Carefor
the Infant Engaged in an Adult Activity, 42 Ind. L.J. 405, 407 (1966-67) [hereinafter cited as A
Proposalfora Modified Standardof Care];Note, Standardof CareApplied to Minors in the Operation
of Dangerous Instrumentalities, 3 Tulsa L.J. 186, 187 (1966). They claim that a factfinder can
distinguish the semi-objective test from a purely subjective test that would either ask what the
particular child in question would have been ordinarily expected to do under the circumstances or
whether the child acted in good faith. See Shulman, supra, at 625. Even if the defenders of the
child standard of care are correct in stating that the test, in fact, has a meaningful objective component,
consideration of the particular child's age, intelligence, and experience in most cases will substantially
increase the likelihood that courts will not find the child's conduct to be negligent. When the child's
age, intelligence and experience are factors which are considered in determining whether the child
acted reasonably under the circumstances, the fairness difficulties discussed infra at note 96 are
greatly reduced. The child is more likely to be capable of meeting this standard.
8. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A comment c (1965).
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Gunnells v. Dethrage, 366 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Ala. 1979); Farm Bureau Ins. Group
v. Phillips, 323 N.W.2d 477, 478 (Mich. 1982). See generally A Proposalfor a Modified Standard
of Care, supra note 7.
11. See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 872 (1964).
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Courts have restricted the adult activity exception to one set of activities: those involving motorized vehicles of any kind.' 2 The operation of
automobiles,' tractors,1 snowmobiles,"' motorboats, 6 motorcycles, 7
motorscooters, 1s go carts,19 mopeds, 20 and minibikes2 1 have all been held
to be adult activities. The strict limits on the kind of activities uniformly
held to fall within the exception present one obvious basis for criticizing
its present description. Motorized activities are not activities "normally
undertaken only by adults"; 22 neither do all motorized activities require
adult qualifications. Thus, from the outset, the description of which activities fall within an exception to the usual child standard of care rule
is inaccurate and misleading.
Furthermore, based on the number of negligence cases involving minor
drivers, the adult standard of care probably is now applied in the majority
of negligence cases involving minors.2 3 In other words, based on frequency of application, the adult standard of care is not the exception but
the rule. If the adult activity exception were renamed the motorized
12. There is only one decision involving a non-motorized activity in which the adult standard of
care was applied to a minor defendant. In Neumann v. Shlansky, 58 Misc. 2d 128, 294 N.Y.S.2d
628 (1968), aff'd, 63 Misc. 2d 587, 312 N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. Term 1970), aft'd, 318 N.Y.S.2d
925 (App. Division 1971), the trial court held that golfing was an adult activity and, therefore, the
11-year-old defendant golfer should be held to an adult standard of care. Three other courts have
stated that the adult standard of care is not applicable to minor golfers. See Meyer v. Smith, 428
S.W.2d 612, 613 (Ky. 1968); Gremillion v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 130, 132 (La.
1976); Kirchoffner v. Quam, 264 N.W.2d 203, 207 (N.D. 1978).
13. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Or. 426, 374 P.2d 896 (1962).
14. See, e.g., Jackson v. McCuiston, 448 S.W.2d 33 (Ark. 1969); Goodfellow v. Coggbum, 560
P.2d 873 (Idaho 1977).
15. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1979).
16. See, e.g., Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1961).
17. See, e.g., Black v. Quinn, 646 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
18. See, e.g., Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 407 P.2d 50 (1965); Powell v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966).
19. See, e.g., Ewing v. Biddle, 216 N.E.2d 863 (Ind. 1963).
20. See, e.g., Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 455 N.E.2d 362 (Ind. App. 1983).
21. See, e.g., Perricone v. Di Bartolo, 302 N.E.2d 637 (II. App. 1973).
22. At least one state permits minors to drive motor vehicles on public roads as early as age 14.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-7-105(1) (1980). The age of majority in Tennessee is 18. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 1-3-105(29) (Supp. 1984).
In most states the legal unrestricted driving age is 15 or 16. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:407
(1984) (age 15); Miss. Code Ann. § 63-1-9 (1983) (age 15); Or. Rev. Stat. § 482.110 (1984) (age
16). Minors frequently drive snowmobiles, go-carts, motorboats, tractors and various other types
of motorized vehicles.
23. A high percentage of negligence cases involve motor vehicles. See F. Harper & F. James,
The Law of Torts 733 (1956); R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim
13-14 (1965). Minors are heavy users of motor vehicles. In 1980, persons under age 20 comprised
9.8% of America's automobile drivers. Accident Facts, National Safety Council (1981). Furthermore,
a disproportionate percentage of drivers under age 20 are involved in automobile accidents. In 1980,
they were involved in 15.8% of the fatal accidents and 16.8% of all accidents. Id.; see also James
& Dickinson, Accident Pronenessand Accident Law, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 775 (1950). Minors do
not, however, engage in a number of other activities where negligence cases frequently arise, such
as in the areas of professional malpractice and products liability.
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vehicle rule, it would more accurately describe the activities to which
courts presently apply the adult standard of care. Such relabelling, however, only reinforces the more fundamental problem with courts' present
categorization of activities. Neither "adult" nor "motor vehicle" accurately describes the activities to which the adult standard should apply.
As will be demonstrated, a broader label such as the dangerous activities
rule would provide a more accurate description.

II. A CRITIQUE OF THE DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR MINORS' USE
OF FIREARMS AND MOTOR VEHICLES
Based on the number of recently reported cases, minors' operation of
motor vehicles is the activity most frequently resulting in harm to others;
minors' misuse of firearms follows a distant second.24 In cases involving
minor drivers, courts have rejected the child standard of care.25 In contrast,
where minors have injured others while using firearms, modem courts
have uniformly imposed the child standard of care. 26 The following review
of the firearms cases shows that the arguments used to distinguish firearms
from motor vehicles are analytically unsound. There is no principled
justification for applying a child standard of care to one set of dangerous
activities and an adult standard of care to another.
A. HistoricalOverview of the Standard of Care
Until the beginning of the twentieth century most courts applied the
adult standard of care to all persons sued for negligence, including minors
who accidentally injured others with firearms. 27 Very few suits for firearms
injuries were reported during the nineteenth century. One commentator
from that time stated:
24. One annotation on which standard should be applied to minors who use motor vehicles
mentions at least 35 cases. Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 872 (1964). The only other annotation concerning
the standard of care to be applied to minors engaged in a particular type of activity is one concerning
their use of weapons. It cites only to six cases two of which involve airguns. Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d
620 (1973).
25. See, e.g., Harrelson v. Whitehead, 365 S.W.2d 868 (Ark. 1963); Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Or.
426, 374 P.2d 896 (1962); Garatoni v. Teegarden, 154 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. App. 1958); Powell v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966); Costantino v. Wolverine Ins. Co.,
284 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1979).
26. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
27. For example, in Conway v. Reed, 66 Mo. 346 (1877), the defendant, the plaintiff, and other
boys aged 12 to 13 years were playing together with a gun. While the gun was in defendant's
possession it fired, striking the plaintiff's leg, which was later amputated. The Supreme Court of
Missouri affirmed a jury verdict of $1,000, stating "[a]n infant is liable for a tort in the same manner
as an adult." Id. at 350. The court concluded that precedent supported applying an adult standard
to children who accidentally shoot others. Id. at 351.
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The common use of firearms by people of all classes and ages, which
is characteristic of this country, has of course led to the infliction of
a vast number of injuries from negligence in their use. But, for
various reasons, the number of litigated cases arising out of such
injuries have been comparatively few; and the number of cases presenting any question of law which could make them worthy of report,
are still fewer.2"

During the transition from the horse-drawn era to the more dangerous
era of motorized transportation, the more lenient child standard of care
first appeared. In the early part of the twentieth century state courts
universally adopted the child standard of care for minor plaintiffs charged
with contributory negligence in activities such as crossing the street or
riding a bicycle.29 This was a reaction to the increasing frequency and
seriousness of injuries to children caused by motorized transportation.
Most courts, without explaining why, also adopted the child standard of
care for minor defendants charged with negligence while engaged in
motorized activities."
The question of whether the child standardshould also apply to minors
who accidentally injured other persons with firearms was not addressed
by an appellate court until the 1957 decision, Kuhns v. Brugger.3" In
Kuhns, the twelve-year-old defendant accidentally shot and seriously injured his twelve-year-old cousin with their grandfather's pistol. 3" Kuhns,
following the majority rule that the child standard of care applied to
activities engaged in by minors, stated that "it was necessary to inquire
whether [the defendant's] conduct was such as should reasonably have
been expected of a child of like age, intelligence and experience." 33
When Kuhns was decided in 1957, most courts were still applying the
child standard of care to both minor plaintiffs and defendants involved
in automobile accidents.' The adult activity exception to the child standard of care began its ascendancy in 1961 with the decision in Dellwo
v. Pearson." It then received a strong boost when the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted it in 1965. Since that time the four state courts
which have directly addressed the issue of which standard to apply to
28. T. Shearman & A. Redfield, On Negligence (3d ed. 1874).
29. See Gray, supra note 1, at 604-20; James & Dickinson, supra note 23, at 789. See generally
Annot., 107 A.L.R. 4, 12-40 (1937).
This widespread adoption of the more lenient subjective standard of care was spurred on by its
application in two United States Supreme Court cases, Railroad Company v. Gladman, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 401 (1872) and Railroad Company v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
30. See F. Harper & F James, supra note 23, at 768 n.9.
31. 135 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1957).
32. Id. at 398.
33. Id. at 401.
34. See Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 872, 875 n.7 (1964).
35. 107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1961).
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firearms have rejected the adult standard.36 All of these courts had adopted
the adult standard for motorized vehicles prior to deciding their firearms
cases. 37
B. Firearms Cases Contrastedto Motor Vehicle Cases
The following analysis of each firearms case highlights the difficulties
and inconsistencies in each court's reasoning in support of its adoption
of the adult standard for motor vehicles when contrasted with its rejection
of it for firearms. None of the distinctions these courts make between
use of motor vehicles and use of firearms survives critical examination.
1. The Frequency of Harm Rationale
In LaBarge v. Stewart,3" a New Mexico Court of Appeals wrongful
death case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, aged sixteen, was
negligent when he shot the plaintiff's daughter in the head while showing
her how to play Russian roulette.
Thinking the bullet was opposite the firing pin, and that he could
safely pull the trigger five times the defendant pointed the gun barrel
downward about one-inch from [the plaintiff's daughter's] head, and
pulled the trigger with 'medium fast' rapidity ....

fourth time the defendant pulled the trigger.39

The gun fired the

The LaBarge court found the trial court correctly instructed the jury
to apply the child standard of care to the defendant's conduct. In so doing,
36. Purtle v. Shelton, 474 S.W.2d 123 (Ark. 1971); LaBarge v. Stewart, 84 N.M. 222, 501 P.2d
666 (Ct. App. 1972); Thomas v. Inman, 282 Or. 279, 578 P.2d 399 (1978); Prater v. Bums, 525
S.W.2d (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
One federal court also directly addressed this issue. In Stephan v. Martin Firearms, 353 F.2d 819
(2d Cir. 1965), one of the defendants was a 15-year-old boy who, while hunting, accidentally shot
and seriously injured the plaintiff. The court of appeals, applying Connecticut law, affirmed the
decision for defendant because "the jury... had sufficient grounds for finding the shooting accidental
and [defendant] not negligent according to the standard of care set for those his age." Id. at 82425. There was no discussion of why the child standard was applied even though there was no
Connecticut precedent addressing the adult activity exception.
The court of appeals cited to only one Connecticut case, Wood v. O'Neil, 90 Conn. 497, 97 A.
753 (1916) in support of its decision. Wood was one of the rare early cases involving a minor
defendant who injured someone with a gun. How the accident in Wood occurred was greatly disputed,
and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the decision for defendant because, based on the
evidence, the jury could have found either that the plaintiff's decedent was contributorily negligent
or that the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. Id. at 501, 97 A.
at 754. Wood did not discuss what standard of care applied to either the plaintiff's decedent or the
defendant but it seems likely that, because the supreme court believed that at least the defendant
and possibly both minors were negligent, it applied the more demanding adult standard of care.
37. Harrelson v. Whitehead, 365 S.W.2d 868 (Ark. 1963); Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 407
P.2d 50 (1965); Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Or. 426, 374 P.2d 896 (1962); Powell v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966).
38. 84 N.M. 222, 501 P.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1972).
39. Id. at 223, 501 P.2d at 667.
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it expressly declined to expand the New Mexico Supreme Court's motor
vehicle adult standard holding in Adams v. Lopez 4° to cover a minor's
use of firearms. It implied that the main reason 4' for applying the adult
standard in Adams was not present in LaBarge. The LaBarge court quoted
42
from Adams the following oft-repeated passage from Dellwo v. Pearson:
To give legal sanction to the operation of automobiles by teen-agers
with less than ordinary care for the safety of others is impractical
today, to say the least. We may take judicial notice of the hazard of
automobile traffic, the frequency of accidents, the often catastrophic
results of accidents, and the fact that immature individuals are no
less prone to accidents than adults. 3
Automobile accidents occur much more frequently than firearm accidents. Based on this fact, much of what is stated in LaBarge's quotation
from Dellwo reasonably distinguishes the use of cars from the use of guns
and might persuasively be used to limit the applicability of the adult
standard to minors involved in automobile accidents. But Dellwo was not
an automobile case. It imposed liability under the adult standard on a
twelve-year-old defendant whose operation of an outboard motorboat
injured the plaintiff. In Dellwo, the defendant's propeller became entangled in the plaintiff's fishing line causing her fishing reel to hit the side
of her boat. The reel came apart and part of it flew into the plaintiff's
glasses, injuring her eye.'
The Dellwo hazard frequency and graveness rationale for applying the
adult standard seems more applicable to firearms than motorboats; minors
appear to injure others accidentally through their use of firearms more
often and more seriously than through their use of motorboats. Never40. 75 N.M. 503, 407 P.2d 50 (1965).
41. The LaBarge court also noted both the importance of drivers' licensing statutes and the danger
of opening the floodgates if it broadened the adult activities exception. 84 N.M. at 226, 501 P.2d
at 670.
42. 107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1961).
43. 84 N.M. at 226, 501 P.2d at 670 (quoting Adams, 75 N.M. at 507, 407 P.2d at 52, which
quoted Dellwo, 107 N.W.2d at 863). See also Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Or. 426, 447, 374 P.2d 896,
906 (1962) (quoting the same passage from Dellwo).
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Adams expanded the impact of the quoted Dellwo dicta relating
to automobiles beyond the limits the Dellwo court intended. In Dellwo, the court expressly limited
the applicability of the adult standard to minor defendants. 107 N.W.2d at 863. On the other hand,
Adams involved the contributory negligence of a 16-year-old who, while riding on his motor scooter,
collided with defendant's automobile. All or nothing contributory negligence was still the rule in
New Mexico when Adams was decided. The effect of applying the adult standard to plaintiff's
contributory negligence in Adams, therefore, was to increase the likelihood that the plaintiff's
recovery would be completely barred as it in fact was. The Adams court's adoption of the adult
standard of care where the minor involved was the plaintiff typifies the phenomenon, discussed supra
note 100 and accompanying text, of courts refusing to recognize any policy differences for distinguishing between minor plaintiffs and defendants.
44. 107 N.W.2d at 860.
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theless, the LaBarge court used the reasoning that the Dellwo court gave
for applying the adult standard of care to minor motorboat operators to
explain why application of the adult standard to minor users of firearms
was inappropriate.
Many courts embracing Dellwo's above-quoted dictum state, as did
the Dellwo court, that "in the operation of an automobile, airplane or
powerboat, a minor is to be held to the same standard of care as an
adult." 4 5 Singling out these activities raises the question of why the adult
standard should apply to them but not to motorless dangerous activities
such as firing a gun. Dellwo is the only reported motorboat accident case
involving a minor defendant; there is no reported case in which a minor
pilot accidentally injures someone. It is apparent, therefore, that despite
the Dellwo rationale, the distinction between motorized and motorless
activities is not based on how frequently minors engage in a particular
activity.
2. The Precedent and Adult Activity Rationales
In the Oregon decision, Thomas v. Inman,' the plaintiff brought a
wrongful death action against an eleven-year-old boy who accidentally
shot and killed the plaintiff's son, aged ten. The plaintiff's son, the
defendant, and another boy had played together unsupervised for some
time when the following occurred:
[The defendant] then went into his parent's bedroom and took a
shotgun from underneath the bed. He inspected the chamber of the
shotgun twice and saw that it was empty; he therefore assumed that
the gun was not loaded. He did not know there was a magazine
underneath the chamber which contained shells. He had never fired
the gun before. [The defendant] pumped the shotgun, pointed it down
the hall in the general direction of the other boys, although not at
anyone or anything in particular, and pulled the trigger. The shot
from the .12 gauge shotgun struck decedent.47

The plaintiff urged the Oregon Supreme Court to extend its earlier
holding in Nielsen v. Brown48 that an adult standard applies to minor
defendants involved in automobile accidents to this situation involving a
gun. The court rejected this request.49 Instead, for the first time it expressly
applied the child standard to minor defendants. Prior to Thomas the issue
45. Id. at 863. See also Goodfellow v. Coggbum, 560 P.2d 873, 875 (Idaho 1977); Nielsen v.
Brown, 232 Or. 426, 448, 374 P.2d 896, 908 (1962). Accord W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note
1, at 181.
46. 282 Or. 279, 578 P.2d 399 (1978).
47. Id. at 281-82, 578 P.2d at 401.
48. 232 Or. 426, 374 P.2d 896 (1962).
49. Id. at 286, 578 P.2d at 403.
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of whether the child standard should apply to the negligence of minor
defendants as well as to the contributory negligence of minor plaintiffs
had been left open in Oregon.5
The court gave only two reasons for refusing to extend Nielsen: no
other state had applied the adult standard to use of firearms; and driving
was an adult activity while use of firearms was not. 5 The first reason
carries little analytical weight. Only four other courts in the United States
had specifically addressed the issue of applying the adult standard to the
use of firearms by minors and their decisions were not binding on the
Oregon court.52 The second reason is based on erroneous assumptions.
While it is true, as the court noted, that children in rural areas frequently
learn to use guns at an early age, 53 it is equally true they learn to use
motorized vehicles, including highly sophisticated and dangerous farm
equipment, at an early age.54 Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court's statement
that "the principal reason for not extending the rule in this case is that
the handling of guns in Oregon is not 'an activity which is normally
undertaken only by adults"' is of doubtful validity.55
3. The Hunting Accident Cases-The Right to Hunt Rationale
The two remaining firearm cases both involve hunting accidents. In
discussing the standard of care applicable to minors who use firearms, a
distinction can be made between hunting accidents and most other forms
of gun accidents. Typically, the minor involved in a hunting accident is
more experienced in the use of firearms. Hunting by minors is also
frequently subject to some form of licensing.56
How these differences between hunting accidents and other gun accidents should cut is unclear. Arguably, because minors who hunt with
guns are often experienced and subject to governmental regulation, they
are analogous to minor users of automobiles. The two courts which have
50. Id. at 285 n.3, 578 P.2d at 403 n.3.
51. Id. at 286, 578 P.2d at 403.
52. See supra note 36.
53. Thomas, 282 Or. at 286, 578 P.2d at 403.
54. See, e.g., Jackson v. McCuiston, 448 S.W.2d 33 (Ark. 1969), in which a 14-year-old tractor
operator injured his 9-year-old friend. The court applied the adult standard to the defendant whom
the court stated had "regularly operated all different types of farm tractors since he was twelve years
of age." Id. at 35. See also Goodfellow v. Coggburn, 560 P.2d 873 (Idaho 1977) (13-year-old tractor
operator killed when defendant's car colided with the tractor-adult standard of care applied to the
tractor driver).
55. Thomas, 282 Or. at 286, 578 P.2d at 403.
56. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:3-4.7 (West 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-2-102(a) (1983);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 29.09(1) (West 1984). Hunting statutes vary widely among jurisdictions. Some
states do not regulate hunting by minors at all. See, e.g., Purtle, 474 S.W.2d at 125 ("A child may
lawfully hunt without a hunting license at any age under sixteen").
There is a growing trend towards states requiring some type of safety instruction prior to licensing
hunters. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:3-4.2 (West 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-2-108(a) (1983).
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decided hunting cases, however, have reached the opposite conclusion;
for them hunting by minors of all ages is deserving of lenient treatment.57
In Purtle v. Shelton,5" the Arkansas Supreme Court applied a child
standard of care to a seventeen-year-old defendant who accidentally injured a sixteen-year-old plaintiff during a deer hunting expedition. In so
doing, the court distinguished a prior case in which it had extended its
automobile adult standard of care rule to an unlicensed fourteen-year-old
who had injured a nine-year-old while operating a tractor-propelled stalk
cutter.59 In the earlier case, the court held that operation of farm equipment, unlike use of firearms, was an activity "normally engaged in only
by adults."' The Purtle court stated, in contrast to the conclusion in
relation to farm equipment, that it could not "conscientiously declare,
without proof and on the basis of mere judicial notice, that only adults
normally go deer hunting." 6" "We know, from common knowledge, that
.22 caliber rifles
youngsters only six or eight
62 years old frequently use
and other lethal firearms."
The Purtle court's defining of adult activities to include motorized farm
equipment and exclude firearms is no more defensible than was the Oregon
court's similar categorization in Thomas. Arguably, children as young as
six or eight also frequently drive farm equipment. It seems likely that
the true reason for the disingenuous line-drawing by the Purtle and Thomas
courts is the one given in the other hunting decision, Praterv. Burns.63
In Prater, the thirteen-year-old defendant's shotgun accidentaly discharged and killed a fourteen-year-old boy as the defendant was leaving
to go hunting. The Tennessee Court of Appeals based its refusal to apply
an adult standard to a minor hunter's conduct primarily on the public
policy of encouraging young children to hunt. "[T]he established public
policy of this state is that a child of any age may possess, own, use and
employ a gun for hunting . . . without meeting any requirement as to
age, ability, experience, knowledge orjudgment in the use of the weapon.64
"

57. Purtle, 474 S.W.2d at 125; Prater v. Bums, 525 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
58. 474 S.W.2d 123 (Ark. 1971). Vigorous criticism of the court's refusal to apply the adult
standard of care in Purtle can be found in Judge Fogelman's dissent. Id. at 126-30; Note, TortsThe Standard of Care Required of a Minor Using Dangerous Instrumentalities, 26 Ark. L. Rev.
243 (1972).
59. Purtle, 474 S.W.2d at 125 (distinguishing Jackson v. McCuiston, 448 S.W.2d 33 (Ark.
1969)).
60. Jackson v. McCuiston, 448 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ark. 1969).
61. Purtle, 474 S.W.2d at 125.
62. Id.
63. 525 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
64. Id. at 851 (emphasis added). This assertion is certainly open to reassessment based on a
recently enacted Tennessee statute which states:
Every person born on or after January 1, 1969, before hunting shall possess, in
addition to all other licenses and permits required, proof of satisfactory completion
of an agency approved hunter education course, except this provision shall not
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This statement seems to suggest that minors should be immune from any
tort liability resulting from hunting accidents. Instead, it was used to
justify different standards of care for minors who drove motor vehicles
and minors who used guns.
Among modem courts there appears to be a deep-rooted romantic
abhorrence of any rule that might deter youngsters from hunting. Decisions rejecting the adult standard based on these feelings miss the important point that it is unlikely that anyone would sue a young hunter
unless an insurance company was going to pay any damages awarded.65
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the adult standard has deterred
minors drom driving automobiles.' Similarly it is very unlikely that the
adult standard would deter minors from hunting.
4. The Licensing Rationale
Some courts distinguish between driving and hunting because of the
different licensing requirements for the two activities." For example, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals in Prater argued that, in contrast to Tennessee's hunting statutes, statutes concerning the licensing of drivers
clearly evidenced the legislature's implied intent that all drivers should
be held to the same standard of care when sued in negligence. 6 It pointed
out that the requirements for obtaining a driver's license included tests
of skill and ability while a child could obtain a hunting license by just
paying a fee. A number of other courts, including the Tennessee Supreme
Court, however, have discredited and rejected such licensing rationales.69
The Tennessee Supreme Court first applied the adult standard of care
to a minor in Powell v. HartfordAccident and Indemnity Company.7" The
defendant in Powell alleged that the negligence of the plaintiff, aged
fourteen, contributed to the collision between the defendant's car and the
plaintiff's motor scooter. 7 The Powell court noted that driving was subject
to extensive regulation. Nevertheless, it stated explicitly that licensing
of minor drivers was not the basis for its adoption of the adult standard
apply to persons under ten (10) years of age accompanied by an adult at least
twenty-one (21) years of age. For the purpose of this section, "accompanied" is
defined as being able to take immediate control of the hunting device.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-2-108(a) (1984).
65. See infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 23.
67. See, e.g., Allen v. Ellis, 380 P.2d 408, 412-13 (Kan. 1963); Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503,
507, 407 P.2d 50, 52 (1965).
68. 525 S.W.2d at 851.
69. See, e.g., Uddo v. Parker, 31 Cal. Rptr. 745, 748-50 (Ct. App. 1963); Charbonneau v.
MacRury, 153 A. 457, 461-62 (N.H. 1931); Nielson v. Brown, 231 Or. 426, 448, 374 P.2d 896,
908 (1962); Powell v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727, 731-33 (Tenn. 1966).
70. 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966).
71. Id. at 729.
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but "merely evidence of the public policy that supports the common
law. "72
The licensing rationale which the Tennessee Court of Appeals used in
Prater also directly conflicts with that court's own assessment of the
73
function of licensing in a case decided after Prater.In Black v. Quinn,
the defendant alleged that plaintiff, aged eleven, was contributorily negligent. The plaintiff and his friend, who were both unlicensed, had been
riding their motorcycles on some undeveloped property. They drove off
the property and onto a public road. The plaintiff collided with the defendant's car as he attempted to pass her.74
Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the Powell adult standard of care
exception was only applicable to licensed minor drivers, the court of
appeals noted in Black that the supreme court "expressly disallowed the
licensing rationale as a basis for its decision." 75 And, yet, in Praterthe
court of appeals took great pains to contrast the type and extent of licensing
procedures for motor vehicles to those for guns .76 The Prater licensing
rationale is simply irreconcilable with that same court's rejection of such
a rationale in Black.
In general, the licensing rationale for an adult activity exception is an
analytical red herring. Courts which apply the adult standard to minor
drivers based on their state licensing statutes justify their actions by
claiming that these statutes evidence a legislative intent to apply the same
duty of care to minor drivers as to adults.77 There are three problems with
such a claim. First, there is typically no evidence whatsoever that the
legislature actually intended to affect the common law standards of care
for children and adults in tort actions when they enacted licensing statutes.
Second, if courts really believed that legislatures intended licensing
statutes to specify a uniform standard of care, it would logically follow
that anyone who injured another while driving without a license would
be subject to a negligence per se or at least an evidence of negligence
analysis. This, however, is not how most courts view violations of licensing statutes. Instead, the majority rule is that driving without a license
has no causal connection and is irrelevant to the issue of whether a person,
Id.at 732.
646 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
Id.at 438.
Id.at 439.
525 S.W.2d at 851.
For example, in Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 407 P.2d 50 (1965), the court said:
We have carefully considered the statutes of this State permitting the licensing of
minors to operate motor vehicles and conclude that they do not provide different
standards for minors and adults. A mere reading of our motor vehicle licensing
statutes makes it obvious that they were enacted for the protection of the public.
Id. at 507, 407 P.2d at 52.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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adult or child, acted unreasonably under the circumstances. 71 It is hard
to reconcile this with court claims that these same licensing statutes were
enacted with the legislative purpose of changing the common law child
standard of care as it applies to minor drivers who are old enough to
obtain drivers' licenses.
Finally, the licensing rationale is frequently ignored by courts which
previously embraced it. The Tennessee experience discussed earlier is not
atypical. While using licensing to justify its adoption of the adult standard
of care exception as to licensed minor drivers, at a later date the same
court will blithely expand its application of the exception to unlicensed
motor vehicle activities."
5. The Floodgate Rationale
The Purtle court suggested a final rationale for limiting the adult standard of care to the use of motor vehicles: the ugly specter of opening up
the floodgates of liability if it classified hunting as an adult activity. 0
This raises the question of what exactly would happen if those floodgates
were opened.
At present the rule in most jurisdictions is that if a minor's use of a
motorized vehicle results in a civil suit for accidental injury, the adult
standard of care will apply to the minor.8 " Most accidents in which minors
sue or are sued involve motorized vehicles. Thus, when courts first embraced the adult activity rule as applying to automobile use by minors,
78. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 1, at 226. See, e.g., Giles v. Gardner, 249 So. 2d
824, 827 (Ala. 1971); Hertz Driv-Ur-Self System v. Hendrickson, 121 P.2d 483, 484 (Colo. 1942);
Prichard v. Collins, 15 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Ky. 1929).
Professor Charles Gregory, the author of the only major article concerning the impact of violation
of licensing statutes on civil liability, agrees that violations of licensing statutes should be inadmissible
on issues of negligence. Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36
Cornell L.Q. 622 (1951). He argues, however, that the reason for this is not that there is no causal
connection between driving without a license and the defendant's alleged act of negligence. Instead
he asserts:
[A] licensing statute is not a safety statute and, therefore, is not the kind of statute
the breach of which amounts to negligence per se. It does not specify the standard
or correct way to do anything; while driving without a license does not signify
in any conceivable way that at the time in question such driving did not come
up to the approved standard in any respect. This is true because a licensing statute
does not stipulate what standard conduct on the road should be ...
Id. at 634-35. Accord W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 1, at 223.
79. Compare Harrelson v. Whitehead, 365 S.W.2d 868, 869 (Ark. 1963) (15-year-old motorcyclist
held to adult standard based in part on licensing statutes) with Jackson v. McCuiston, 448 S.W.2d
33, 35 (Ark. 1969) (14-year-old tractor operator held to adult standard where no licensing statute
involved).
80. 472 S.W.2d at 126.
81. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
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they opened the floodgates. The child standard of care was from that
moment on effectively limited to the exceptional cases.82
III. THE RATIONALES FOR THE CHILD STANDARD OF CARE
Examination of the firearms cases highlights the inappropriateness of
applying one standard of care to some dangerous activities and another
standard of care to others. None of the rationales for this distinction hold
up under close scrutiny. The same standard of care, therefore, should
apply to all dangerous activities of minors regardless of whether they
involve motor vehicles.
This still leaves open the question of which standard of care ought to
apply to dangerous activities. Are courts and commentators correct when
they say that the adult standard of care should apply to certain activities
involving minors? Why has the child standard of care been losing ground
in recent years? Are there any activities to which it still ought to apply?
These questions cannot be answered without first considering the reasons that the child standard of care has been viewed as the norm for
minors during the twentieth century. Courts and commentators provide
three major rationales to support the child standard of care where a minor
is sued for negligence: protection, welfare, and fairness. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts refers to two of these, commenting that its special
standard for children "arises out of the public interest in their welfare
and protection."" The Restatement says that the protection rationale
justifies the child standard of care because it prevents child defendants
84
from always entirely bearing the consequence of their actions. The
Restatement and commentators say the child standard is also justified by
a welfare rationale because it allows children to mature and develop skills
by engaging in various activities. 8 The third rationale for the child standard of care is fairness. Many children do not have the capacity to meet
the adult standard of care. The child standard alleviates the unfairness of
holding them to a standard of care which they are unable to meet.
The following analysis of these rationales shows that they no longer
support the application of the more lenient child standard of care to most
activities of minors which result in negligence suits. The protection and
welfare rationales are irrelevant under modern tort doctrine; the fairness
rationale only relates to carefree play activities.
82. In addition to use of firearms, courts have rejected the adult standard of care when minors
have injured others while engaging in the following dangerous activities: skiing, Goss v. Allen, 70
N.J. 442, 360 A.2d 388 (1976); making a fire, Farm Bureau Ins. Group v. Phillips, 323 N.W.2d
477 (Mich. App. 1982); and bicycling, Roberts v. Fisher, 455 P.2d 871 (Colo. 1969).
83. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A comment b (1965).
84. Id. at comment a.
85. Note, Torts: Application of Adult Standardof Care to Minor Motor Vehicle Operators, 1962
Duke L.J. 138, 139; A Proposalfor a Modified Standardof Care, supra note 7, at 408.
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A. A Critique of the Protection Rationale
Courts and commentators had widely supported the protection rationale
because it softened the effects of the all or nothing contributory negligence
defense.8 6 When virtually all jurisdictions followed the contributory negligence rule, its harshness cried out for exceptions. Children were frequently injured in accidents for which they were in part to blame.8 7 During
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century most of the child
negligence cases involved injured minor plaintiffs charged with contributory negligence. 88 Without some means of excepting them from the usual
contributory negligence rule, child plaintiffs would probably have lost
many of these cases. By altering the standard of care to take into account
their age, intelligence, and experience, courts enabled child plaintiffs to
recover in situations where, had they been held to the reasonable person
under the circumstances standard, they would have been found contributorily negligent.
Within the past twenty years contributory negligence has gone into
dramatic decline, replaced in most jurisdictions by some form of comparative negligence. 89 Rules created to ameliorate the severity of contributory negligence are no longer necessary; for example, last clear
chance has frequently been held, either by statute or case law, to be
inapplicable where states have adopted comparative negligence.' Similarly, the present child standard of care rules may no longer be necessary
or appropriate in the age of comparative negligence.
B. A Critique of the Welfare Rationale
The welfare rationale for the child standard of care is intended to allow
children to learn by doing.9 Practical hands-on experience is considered
an essential part of the learning process for children to mature into responsible adults.92 Such experience is necessary for the development of
judgment and essential skills. It is not clear, however, that the application
or non-application of the child standard of care affects minors' willingness
86. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A comment a (1965).
87. See Shulman, supra note 7, at 618.
88. Id. at 618-19. See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873) (defendant
railroad alleged contributory negligence of six-year-old plaintiff injured on railroad's unlocked turntable); Railroad Co. v. Gladman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 401 (1872) (defendant trolley car company
alleged contributory negligence of seven-year-old plaintiff injured trying to cross in front of horsedrawn trolley).
89. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note i, at 471.
90. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.475 (1983); French v. Grigsby, 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978).
See generally W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 1, at 477.
91. See supra note 85.
92. Note, supra note 85, at 139; A Proposalfor a Modified Standardof Care, supra note 7, at
408.
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to engage in various activities. Whatever evidence there is points the
other way.93
Under the welfare rationale, when courts decided that the child standard
of care no longer applied to motorized activities, minors should have
been deterred from driving. There is nothing to suggest that application
of the adult standard of care to minor motor vehicle operators has had
any measurable impact on the numbers or the frequency of individual
use.' In general, it seems extremely unlikely that minors consider the
legal standard of care in negligence cases when they decide whether to
engage in a particular activity. The welfare rationale, therefore, does not
support the retention of the child standard of care in firearms cases.
C. The Limited Vitality of the FairnessRationale
The previous discussion of the protection and welfare rationales shows
that they do not justify use of the child standard of care. Analysis of the
fairness rationale, however, will show that the child standard of care is
appropriate for a limited group of activities.
In discussing the fairness rationale, this Article addresses separately
the two fundamentally different categories of activities in which minors
engage. It will show that the fairness rationale is inapplicable to dangerous
activities such as hunting, driving, and making a fire. It will also show
that the fairness rationale is applicable to carefree activities such as running and playing ball, hopscotch, and tag.
1. Dangerous Activities and the Fairness Rationale
Where minors injure others, application of an adult standard of care
frequently increases the likelihood that they will be found liable. Finding
liability in such cases is arguably unfair because many minors are incapable of meeting the adult standard of care. The unfairness argument
supports a more individualized standard of care which takes into account
the minor's immaturity.9" One difficulty with applying an individualized
standard to minors' conduct, however, is that courts hold other classes
of defendants who are incapable of exercising mature judgment to the
reasonable person standard. The insane, the mentally retarded, alcoholics,
and the elderly are all, at least in theory, held to the adult standard of
care' despite the unfairness of applying this standard which they are
unable to meet.
93. See Ross, Settled Out of Court 42-43 (2d ed. 180).
94. See supra note 23.
95. Dorais v. Paquin, 98 N.H. 159, 304 A.2d 369, 371 (1973); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra
note 1, at 179.
96. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child, the standard
of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under
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Another difficulty with the fairness rationale is highlighted in the leading case concerning the adoption of the motorized vehicle rule, Dellwo
v. Pearson.97 It points out that applying the child standard of care may
cause greater unfairness to the persons whom minors injure. Thus, the
unfairness to minors where an adult standard of care is applied to their
injurious conduct is arguably outweighed by the unfairness to the injured
party when the child standard is applied.
While minors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate
with age, experience, and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate to their age, experience, and wisdom, it would be unfair
to the public to permit a minor in the operation of a motor vehicle
to observe any other standards of care and conduct than those expected of all others. A person observing children at play with toys,
...or engaged in other childhood activities may anticipate conduct
that does not reach an adult standard of care or prudence. However,
like circumstances"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child,
his insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for conduct which
does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like circumstances"). Compare W.
Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 1,at 176-78, which points out that there are a few cases in which
old age has been considered as a factor in applying the standard of care. All these cases, however,
involved elderly plaintiffs who were charged with contributory negligence. See, e.g., Garner v.
Crawford, 288 So. 2d 886 (La. App. 1973); Brunner v. John, 274 P.2d 581 (Wash. 1954). Similarly,
where contributory negligence has been alleged against an insane or mentally retarded plaintiff,
many courts have considered the mental disability as a factor in determining whether the plaintiff
acted reasonably under the circumstances. See Ellis, Tort Responsibility of the Mentally Disabled,
1981 A.B.F. Research J. 1079, 1090. Compare Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. App.
1965) (contributory negligence alleged) and Emory Univ. v. Lee, 104 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. App. 1958)
(contributory negligence alleged) with Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis.
1970) (negligence alleged) andJohnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1961) (negligence alleged).
Thus, as to elderly and mentally disabled persons, courts are applying a more lenient standard of
care to plaintiffs than to defendants. Contrast this dual standard with most courts' insistence on
applying a uniform standard of care to minor plaintiffs and minor defendants. See infra note 100.
The Restatement's authors distinguish children from other categories of persons because, as to
children, there is a "wide basis of community experience upon which it is possible, as a practical
matter, to determine what is to be expected of them." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A comment
b (1965). This explanation, however, is equally applicable to at least some of the groups listed
above; for those groups to which it is inapplicable expert testimony is available to fill the information
gap. Nevertheless, with the lone exception of children, courts reject the unfairness argument and
hold defendants with mental disabilities to the reasonable person standard which they are incapable
of meeting.
In contrast, exception for children is not made in the intentional tort area. There, most courts
hold both children and mentally disabled adults responsible for the injuries they cause even though,
at least arguably, they are incapable of forming the requisite intent. Compare Weisbart v. Flohr, 260
Cal. App. 2d 281, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1968) (seven-year-old defendant); Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d
304 (Colo. 1974) (three- and four-year-old defendants); Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash.
1955) (5-year-old defendant) with Kaicer v. Marrero, 324 So. 2d 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(mentally defective defendant liable for assault and battery); McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass.
1937) (mentally defective defendant liable for assault and battery); In re Meyer's Guardianship, 261
N.W. 211 (Wis. 1935) (mentally defective defendant liable for arson). See generally Bohlen, Liability
in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 9 (1924).
97. 107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1961).
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one cannot know whether the operation of an approaching automobile, airplane, or powerboat is a minor or an adult, and usually
98
cannot protect himself against youthful imprudence even if warned.

The equities being compared are quite different when the minor is the
injured plaintiff. There, as some courts and commentators have sug98. Id. at 863.
This excerpt from Dellwo suggests that a plaintiff injured by a minor driver could not reasonably
have expected that an approaching driver was a minor. It then goes on to assert, however, that even
if a plaintiff did know defendant was a minor, this would not help plaintiff protect himself from the
minor's immature judgment and, therefore, should not be determinative of what standard of care
should be applied to the minor defendant. Thus, for the Dellwo court, whether the minor defendant
was known to the plaintiff to be a minor or whether he appeared to be an adult would make no
difference to what standard of care was applied to the defendant.
One commentator disagrees with the Dellwo court on this point and has suggested that "in addition
to the nature of the minor's activity, the reasonable expectations of the other actor" should be
considered in determining whether to apply the adult or child standard of care. Seidelson, Reasonable
Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and
the Mentally Incompetent, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 17, 46 (1981).
Interestingly enough, Seidelson concluded that persons injured by minor drivers should reasonably
expect that the adult standard of care will apply to all drivers and that these reasonable expectations
justify applying the adult standard of care to all minor drivers. Id. at 20. Thus, Seidelson's reasonable
expectation test appears to go to whether the injured person should reasonably expect that a particular
standard of care will be applied rather than going to whether the injured person should reasonably
expect that the other party may be a minor who has a lesser judgment capacity.
After discussing the standard of care for minor motor vehicle operators, Seidelson analyzed a
firearms case, Purtle, 474 S.W.2d 123, discussed supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. In
Purtle, a 17-year-old defendant was held to the child standard of care in a suit for negligence by a
16-year-old plaintiff whom the defendant accidentally shot while they were out hunting together.
Seidelson, supra, at 24. Seidelson claimed that the application of the child standard of care in Purtle
was appropriate because the plaintiff knew the defendant and, therefore, knew he was a minor. He
concluded that "it probably would not be unfair to impute to the plaintiff knowledge that his teenaged
hunting companion might not possess the maturity of judgment of an adult. Consequently, it could
be said that plaintiff had no reasonable expectation that defendant would act with that maturity of
judgment at the time of the operative facts." Id. The test for reasonable expectation here seems to
differ from the one used for motor vehicles. Here, the plaintiff should reasonably have expected that
the defendant might act with the lesser judgment than that of an adult.
As a result of using different tests for drivers than for users of firearms, Seidelson would apply
an adult standard of care to all minor drivers and only some minor users of firearms, those about
whom the injured party did not have actual or constructive knowledge of their minority. It is difficult
to understand why the reasonable expectations test applied to persons injured by minor motor vehicle
operators should differ from the test applied to persons injured by minor users of firearms.
Even if a uniform reasonable expectations test were adopted, such a test would require a caseby-case determination of whether the plaintiff knew or should have known that the defendant was
a minor. There would be no certainty as to which standard applied to any category of activities.
This problem would be compounded when, as frequently is the case, the injured party was also a
minor. Even if a minor plaintiff knew the minor defendant it is not at all clear that he should have
reasonably expected that the defendant would use less than adult judgment. Would the test for a
minor plaintiff's reasonable expectation be whether a child of like age, intelligence, and experience
would have expected that the defendant would use substandard judgment?
Although Seidelson argued that the reasonable expectation test would be a question of law for
the court, id. at 46, it sounds much more like a question of fact that should be left to the factfinder
to determine. The unpredictability of such a test would probably only make this area even more
murky and analytically dissatisfying.
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gested, 9 it may be fairer to apply the child standard of care to any
negligent conduct of the plaintiff that contributed to the accident. It is
probably more unfair to hold the injured minor to a standard of care which
he is incapable of meeting than it is to require the person who negligently
injured the minor to show the minor did not meet the child standard of
care. After all, in such a case the likelihood of the injuring wrongdoer
compensating the young injured party would be reduced by applying the
unmeetable adult standard to the minor's conduct.
Most courts, however, have rejected a dual standard dependent on
whether the minor is the plaintiff or the defendant. "oTheir application
of an adult standard to both plaintiff and defendant child motor vehicle
operators suggests that there may be another policy reason besides fairness
for applying the adult standard where a dangerous activity is involved.
2. The Impact of Liability Insurance on the Fairness Rationale
The real policy reason for courts applying the adult standard of care
to dangerous activities becomes apparent when a more fundamental, pragmatic question about suing minors for torts is addressed. Why are minors
ever sued by persons they negligently harm? Typically, a minor will have
very few assets; therefore, if a child defendant were solely obligated to
pay the judgment, the plaintiff would collect little or nothing. Obviously
in such cases injured persons would not sue minor tortfeasors.
But minor drivers are frequently sued by people whom they injure.
99. See Dellwo, 107-N.W.2d at 862-63. See generally F. Harper & F. James, supra note 23, at
904; James, Accident Liability Insurance Reconsidered: The Impact of LiabilityInsurance, 57 Yale
L.J. 549, 554-56 (1948); Shulman, supra note 7, at 619.
100. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 1, at 181.
The few courts which have attempted to justify their refusal to apply a dual standard to minor
motor vehicle operators have stated that they see no rational distinction between minor plaintiffs and
minor defendants. See Goss v. Allen, 360 A.2d 388, 391 (N.J. 1976); Thomas v. Inman, 282 Or.
279, 285 n.3, 578 P.2d 399, 403 n.3 (1978). Furthermore, some courts claim that the dual standard
would be too complicated to administer and apply. See, e.g., Goss, 360 A.2d at 391.
These explanations ring hollow when the majority of courts' negligence standards of care for the
insane and the mentally retarded are examined. Like many minors, many mentally disabled persons
are incapable of meeting the usual reasonable person under the circumstances standard of care. The
majority of courts apply a dual standard to mentally disabled persons: a subjective standard of care
which considers the actual mental disability of the actor is applied to plaintiffs; the usual objective
adult standard of care is applied to defendants. Ellis, supra note 96, at 1090. It appears to be no
more rational and no less complicated to apply the dual standard to mentally disabled persons than
it would be to apply it to minor motor vehicle operators.
Compare Ellis' analysis of why the dual standard exists as to mentally disabled persons. Id. at
1090-92. Ellis concluded this analysis by stating: "Whatever the true explanation for the existence
of a subjective standard in contributory negligence cases, the rule stands as a sharp and puzzling
contrast to the standard for defendants." Id. at 1092. To this can be added that the standards of care
applied to mentally disabled persons stand in sharp and puzzling contrast to the standards applied
to minor motor vehicle operators
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The explanation is not that their parents are vicariously liable. Most states
do not allow tort recovery against parents for the negligence of their
children.'' Parents, however, typically have insurance coverage for the
motorized activities of their children.' 0 2 In most jurisdictions the opposing
party is entitled to discover the existence of such coverage.' 3 It is highly
probable that behind most minor defendants stand their parents' insurance
companies.
Courts rarely mention insurance coverage in their discussions of what
standard of care should be applied." Yet such coverage is undoubtedly
an important pragmatic factor. Compensation to the injured party is the
main function of the tort system;' ° insurance is an effective and wellaccepted way of carrying out that function. Courts, therefore, should and
probably have considered the almost certain presence of liability insurance
06
when they have moved to an adult standard of care for minor drivers."
In another area of recent dramatic change in tort law, family immunities, many courts have openly stated that the major reason for abolishing
such immunities is the almost certain presence of liability insurance in
cases where one family member sues another for personal injuries.' °7
101. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 1, at 913.
102. Id. See also F. Harper & F. James, supra note 23, at 768-69; James, supra note 99, at 550.
103. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). Insurance coverage is usually discoverable and, thus, a major
factor to consider when deciding whether to sue the injuring party. See Smith, The Misgenetic Union
of Liability Insurance and Tort Process in the PersonalInjuries Claim System, 54 Cornell L. Rev.
645 (1969). In contrast, at the trial stage of a tort action, the factfinder is not permitted to consider
whether "a person was or was not insured against liability ... upon the issue of whether he acted
negligently or otherwise wrongfully." Fed. R. Evid. 411. The reasons given for this rule are: (1)
that the existence or non-existence of insurance coverage is irrelevant to the issue of whether someone
acted unreasonably; and (2) that juries might use the insurance coverage to decide the case on
improper grounds. Fed. R. Evid. 411 comment. These concerns go to the problem of the factfinder
misusing information about insurance coverage in a particular case. This misuse of information
problem is not present when a court weighs public policy factors in deciding whether a general rule
of law should be changed. Therefore, it is appropriate for a court to consider both the widespread
use of liability insurance for certain activities and the likelihood that minors who are sued will have
insurance coverage.
104. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 1, at 593-94. See also Atkins, Impact of Enterprise
Liability, 20 La. L. Rev. 50, 51 (1959).
105. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 1, at 7.
106. See Smith, supra note 103, at 680 (emphasis added), which states:
Although at first glance the liability of infants . . . may seem an unlikely area
in which to find the influence of insurance, that insurance has in fact resulted
in the imposition of liability where none would otherwise exist under the
principles of the tort process is well documented. The assumed availability of
and resort to insurance is the only explanation for the recent appearance of
minors in the appellate reports as defendants with respect to "adult" activities,
including but not limited to the driving of automobiles.
[W]hen the modern wave of decisions began to engulf the family immunities,
107.
the existence or the possibility of liability insurance began to be stated in nearly
all of the overruling cases, as one of the primary reasons for change.
W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 1, at 595. Cf. James, supranote 99, at 553, which was written
almost 30 years earlier:
A specific situation . . . where, in hard fact, the insurance factor is really the
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Courts have found that the preservation of family harmony, a public policy
used to support such immunities, is now more likely to support the
abolition of family immunities because of the probable existence of insurance coverage. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Immer v. Risko0 8
stated:
The presence of insurance militates against the possibility that the
interspousal relationship will be disrupted since a recovery will in
most cases be paid by the insurance carrier rather than by the deDomestic harmony may be more threatened by
fendant spouse ....
denying a cause of action than by permitting one where there is
insurance coverage.109
Just as insurance coverage moots the family harmony arguments in the
family immunities area, it moots the fairness arguments which courts so
frequently make when they consider whether to abandon the child standard
of care for a particular activity. Because it is not the child defendant who
must pay for the damages caused, the arguments that the child in reality
is unable to meet the adult standard is irrelevant in most cases. Similarly,
where child plaintiffs contribute to their own injuries, the insurance companies which provided coverage to the plaintiffs' parents and the defendants will typically be sharing the damage costs under some form of
comparative negligence.
In the case of the child defendant, the payment of damages falls directly
on the insurance company which pays the judgment and indirectly on the
defendant's parents whose premiums are likely to increase. It falls even
more indirectly upon all parents who have insurance coverage for their
children's motorized activities through increased rates for minor drivers
as a group." 0 If fairness is an important factor in deciding what standard
of care to apply, it is the fairness to the parents and insurance companies
who pay for the injuries caused by minor drivers that is relevant but never
addressed. "
dominant one, yet where most (though not all) of the judicial reasoning ignores
this factor and turns on considerations which the fact of insurance has really
made quite irrelevant, is the field of intra-family suits for negligence. Recovery
by the unemancipated minor child against his parent is almost uniformly denied
for a variety of reasons which involve the integrity of the family unit and the
family exchequer and the importance of parental discipline. But in truth, virtually no such suits are brought except where there is insurance. And where
there is, none of these threats to the family exist at all.
108. 267 A.2d 481 (N.J. 1970).
109. Id. at 484-85. Accord Tamashiro v. DeGama, 51 Haw. 74, 77, 450 P.2d 998, 1001 (1969)
(parental immunity abolished); Baits v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d 66, 75 (Minn. 1966) (parental immunity
abolished); France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 267 A.2d 490, 493 (N.J. 1970) (parental immunity
abolished); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 435-36, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530-32, 245 N.E.2d
192, 193-94 (1969) (parental immunity abolished).
110. See James, supra note 99, at 555-58.
111. Id. at 552-53.
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Increasing insurance premium rates for parents who insure their children's motor vehicle operations is not substantially inequitable. First, the
increased cost co the parents is relatively small, especially in comparison
to the actual cost of the harm their children caused. Second, parents of
minor motor vehicle operators are the appropriate group to bear the burden
of this increased cost; their children are typically economically dependent
upon them and it is usually a parental decision whether to permit a child
to drive.
When focusing on a business entity such as an insurance company, it
is incongruous to consider the type of personal fairness issues which exist
in relation to individual actors such as minor motor vehicle operators and
the people they injure. If the standard of care for a particular group of
insureds is made stricter, an insurance company can make sure that, as
a result, it does not bear an unfair economic burden. It does this by
adjusting the rates it charges for coverage of that group.
Shifting the focus from children to parents and insurance companies
attenuates and depersonalizes the fairness issue. It then becomes apparent
that fairness is not a valid rationale for determining which standard of
care is appropriate.
Rejection of the fairness rationale makes it easier to justify the widely
followed rule that the adult standard applies to everyone involved in
accidents involving motorized vehicles. The risk-spreading function of
insurance coverage is a very strong reason for applying the adult standard
of care to all minor drivers. It is, however, an equally strong reason for
extending the adult standard of care to minors who engage in any dangerous activity because, as stated earlier, the main reason for suing minors
is that they are covered by their parents' insurance policies.' 2
VI. CONCLUSION
States should retain the dual system of standards of care for children.
Which standard is applied should continue to be based on the type of
activity involved. The distinction, however, should not be between adult
and child activities or between motor vehicle and other activities; instead
the distinction should be between dangerous and carefree activities.
112. For example, in Thomas v. Inman, 282 Or. 279, 578 P.2d 399 (1978), discussed supra notes
46-55 and accompanying text, the reason plaintiff sued the 11-year-old defendant who accidentally
shot and killed 10-year-old plaintiff's decedent was that the defendant was covered by his parents'
homeowners insurance policy. Letter from William Ferguson, Esq. of Medford, Oregon, to the writer
(1984). See generally G. Couch, On Insurance § 44:265 (2d ed. 1982).
Homeowner's insurance policies frequently insure children of the homeowner against liability for
injuries to others, including gunshot and fire injuries. This may extend to injuries off the premises,
such as bicycle injuries. Cf. James, supra note 99, at 556 n.21, which suggests that liability insurance
covers even carefree activities of children: "So far as play accidents go, just about the same
possibilities of loss distribution exist through the modem Comprehensive Liability Policy."
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The only legitimate rationale for drawing distinctions between the actions of children and adults is the fairness rationale. The fairness rationale,
however, does not support application of the child standard of care to all
the activities of children. It has been shown to be particularly inapplicable
to minor defendants. First, on balance, the equities favoring the injured
party outweigh those favoring the minor defendant. Second, fairness to
the minor need not be considered at all in most cases because minor
defendants are usually covered by their parents' insurance policies.
The fairness rationale has also provided little support for applying the
child standard of care to minor plaintiffs who engage in dangerous activities. There, however, the fairness rationale might still be relevant if
minor plaintiffs had to pay for the injuries they suffered. The rationale
becomes irrelevant in most cases if, as courts seem to have presumed in
refusing to distinguish between minor plaintiffs and defendants, minor
plaintiffs are typically covered by insurance. In cases involving minor
defendants or minor plaintiffs engaged in dangerous activities, therefore,
the appropriate standard is the adult standard of care.
In contrast, the child standard of care should be applied when the child
was involved in a carefree activity. When a negligence suit involves a
minor engaged in a carefree activity, that minor is inevitably the injured
plaintiff. By definition, carefree activities are those which are unlikely
to cause harm to others. Such activities, however, often lead the minor
into harmful contact with an actor engaged in a dangerous activity. As a
result, minors are frequently injured while engaging in carefree activities.
For example, operators of motor vehicles often collide with minors who
are engaged in carefree activities. 3
For carefree activities, the balancing of the fairness rationales for the
injured minor and the injuring defendant is likely to favor the minor.
Here, as in the case of minor plaintiffs who engage in dangerous activities,
it is probably more unfair to hold the injured minor to a standard he
cannot meet than it is to make the defendant show the minor did not meet
the more individualized child standard of care. Unless insurance moots
the fairness issue, therefore, the child standard of care appears to be the
appropriate one for carefree activities.
Does insurance moot the fairness issue? How frequently minor plaintiffs
113. See, e.g.; Ranard v. O'Neil, 531 P.2d 1000 (Mont. 1975) (eight-year-old pedestrian); Fightmaster v. Mode, 167 N.E. 407 (Ohio App. 1928) (13-year-old pedestrian); Forrest v. Turlay, 125
Or. 251, 266 P. 229 (1928) (11-year-old pedestrian). Cf. Maker v. Wellin, 214 Or. 332, 327 P.2d
793 (1958) (12-year-old bicyclist). Maker is representative of the many decisions which have involved
injured minor bicyclists. Bicycling is one of the most troublesome activities to categorize. It does
not fit neatly into either the carefree or dangerous activity category. It seems likely, however, that
if courts were to use these categories they would place bicycling into the carefree category because
minors usually are injured plaintiffs in bicycling cases and may not be insured; therefore, the fairness
rationale is present.
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are covered by insurance is difficult to ascertain. As previously noted,
minors are typically only sued if they are insured. On the other hand,
whether a minor is insured is probably unrelated to why minors bring
lawsuits. The possibility that some minors who engage in carefree activities do not have medical or health insurance that will cover them if they
are injured by others combined with the fairness rationale justifies the
application of the more lenient child standard of care. If, at some time
in the future, minors injured in carefree activities are also shown to be
normally covered by insurance, the child standard of care can be abandoned entirely.

